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This article examines the relationship between 1996 health plan enrollment and both
HEDIS-based plan performance ratings and individual HEDIS measures. Data were
obtained from a large firm that collected, aggregated, and disseminated plan performance
ratings to its employees. Plan market share regressions are estimated controlling for
out-of-pocket price and model type in addition to the plan ratings and HEDIS measures.
The results suggest that employees did not respond strongly to the provided ratings.
There are several potential explanations for the lack of response, including difficulty
understanding the ratings and never having seen them. In addition, employees may base
their plan choices on information that is obtained from their own past experience, friends,
family, and colleagues. The pattern of results suggests that such information is impor-
tant. Counterintuitive signs most likely reflect an inverse correlation between some
HEDIS ratings (or measures) and attributes employees observe informally.
Many employers, particularly large employers, offer a choice of health
plans. Rice et al. (1997) report that almost 50 percent of large employers offer
several insurance options to their workers and retirees. A Robert Wood John-
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son Foundation survey of establishments suggests that more than 25 percent
of large establishments offer multiple managed care plans.
Managed care plans control many aspects of health care delivery including
the incentives surrounding the provision of care and the set of physicians and
hospitals from which enrollees can seek care. In an effort to facilitate choice
and monitor quality, employers, the media, and accrediting organizations,
such as the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) and the Joint
Commission for Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHCO), have
undertaken extensive, expensive initiatives to measure plan performance. For
example, NCQA has developed, in conjunction with health plans and large
employers, a set of plan performance measures (HEDIS) that many large pur-
chasers require health plans to report (Scanlon and Hendrix 1998).1 This effort
was originally intended to facilitate quality improvement and evaluation of
the plans by employers.
In recent years, many organizations have disseminated HEDIS-based plan
performance ratings in the form of “report cards” to consumers. Periodicals
such as Newsweek and Consumer Reports have published health plan report
cards based, in part, on HEDIS measures, and several large employers have
provided their employees and retirees with similar information (Scanlon et al.
1998). Two assumptions provide the foundation for these efforts.
• Employees are not adequately informed about important health plan attributes
such as the measures contained in the HEDIS data set.
• Employees value the attributes measured by HEDIS and will use HEDIS-based
ratings when choosing plans.
The first assumption is almost surely true in a literal sense. It is unlikely that
individuals are aware of plan performance on specific HEDIS measures such
as use rates for selected services (e.g., mammography, prenatal care, coronary
artery bypass surgery), the percentage of physicians accepting new patients,
physician board certification rates, and the percentage of enrollees satisfied
with the plan. However, individuals may observe more general aspects of
plan performance through sources other than the ratings. We label all of this
additional information that might influence choice informal information, al-
though it could reflect initiatives by others outside of the firm to evaluate
plans. Much of this informal information may include employee experiences
and contacts with friends, relatives, and colleagues. This general assessment
of plan performance may capture a broader set of plan traits than HEDIS and
influence plan choice even when plan ratings are provided.
The second assumption is more difficult to evaluate. Surveys and focus
groups reveal that employees are interested in measures of plan performance
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similar to those contained in HEDIS. However, strong conclusions from such
studies are difficult to obtain because important traits such as the popularity
of physicians and hospitals are not easily captured in hypothetical plan offer-
ings. Hibbard and Jewett (1996) provide some evidence that employee behav-
ior when faced with real choices may differ from that implied when asked
about preferences for plan attributes. Few studies relate plan performance
measures to actual plan enrollment (Scanlon, Chernew, and Lave 1997).
One study (Chernew and Scanlon 1998) examined the relationship between
employer-reported plan performance ratings and health plan enrollment. The
findings indicated that in several domains of performance, better plan ratings
were not associated with a greater probability of plan enrollment. In some
cases, better plan ratings were associated with a lower probability of enroll-
ment. The pattern of results suggested several potential hypotheses. For
example, an inverse relationship was found between enrollment and a rating
of surgical care that rewarded health plans with low surgical use rates. The
study hypothesized that the counterintuitive findings might reflect employee
preference for plans with easier access to specialist services, a plan characteris-
tic that may be correlated positively with high surgical use rates.
Similarly, the study postulated that an inverse relationship between a rat-
ing of satisfaction and plan enrollment might have reflected the inclusion of
measures of physician availability, such as the percentage of physicians
accepting new patients, in the satisfaction rating. Physician availability may
be related inversely to physician popularity because, just as one does not see
long lines at bad restaurants, one may not see substantial enrollment in plans
with many physicians accepting new patients. However, because the underly-
ing HEDIS data that comprised the ratings were not available in the study,
Chernew and Scanlon (1998) were unable to explore these hypotheses.
This article builds on the previous work by modeling plan choice with
more recent data (1996 enrollment) and including underlying HEDIS meas-
ures that comprise plan ratings in the analysis. Several specifications are esti-
mated. The first specification relates plan choice to the ratings in a manner
similar to that in Chernew and Scanlon (1998). It is useful to examine whether
the previous findings still hold for several reasons. First, the presentation of
the information was more clear and user friendly during 1996 enrollment such
that the probability that employees would have noticed the information was
likely greater during 1996 enrollment relative to 1995 enrollment. Second, the
rating construction changed significantly between 1995 and 1996 enrollment.
In 1995, only one rating (“superior”) was assigned for each dimension of plan
performance, but only 25 percent of plans received these ratings. Failure to
achieve a superior rating was not noted on open enrollment materials. For
1996 enrollment, a rating of “above average,” “average,” “needs
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improvement,” or “missing data” was assigned to each plan on each dimen-
sion of performance. Third, the reliability of the data was improved due to bet-
ter plan compliance with HEDIS. Comparison of the findings from 1995 and
1996 permits inferences regarding whether the change in presentation format
altered earlier conclusions.
The second set of specifications included in the analysis models plan choice
as a function of underlying HEDIS measures. This analysis allows exploration
of the hypotheses raised in prior work. Specifically, the counterintuitive signs
most likely reflect a correlation between the ratings and unobserved determi-
nants of plan choice, which we have lumped into our broad definition of infor-
mal information. By disaggregating ratings into their components, we can
assess the aspects of the ratings that are correlated with the informal informa-
tion and gain insight into the nature of plan choice.
Although the underlying HEDIS data were not provided to employees, the
coefficients will reflect the correlation between the HEDIS measures and
information observed through informal sources as well as the firm-provided
ratings. Studies of the hospital market commonly accept the idea that various
aspects of performance (such as hospital mortality rates) may influence choice
even if they are not directly observed by patients, physicians, or insurers (Luft
et al. 1990; Burns and Wholey 1992), presumably because of their correlation
with informal information.
The third set of specifications models plan choice as a function of both the
ratings and individual HEDIS measures. Including both types of data in the
model permits one to assess whether the underlying relationship between the
ratings and plan choice changes when HEDIS measures are included. For
example, does the surgical care rating matter holding surgery rates constant?
Throughout this analysis, we cannot directly measure attributes we believe
are important determinants of plan choice, such as the popularity of physi-
cians or the ease of referrals. Instead, we rely on the pattern of results regard-
ing the HEDIS measures and ratings to explore these hypotheses.
DATA
Similar to 1995, health plan enrollment at this firm was conducted in a
flexible-benefits environment in which employees were given a menu of plans
from which to choose and flex dollars to spend across a variety of benefits,
including health plans. The out-of-pocket price was determined by each busi-
ness unit within the firm and did not equal the premium charged by the health
plan. The benefit package for each health plan was standardized, and previ-
ous analysis suggests that exceptions were minor and noninfluential.
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Chernew and Scanlon (1998) provide more detail regarding health plan selec-
tion at this firm.
SAMPLE
We separate individuals choosing single coverage from those choosing
family coverage because these employees face different prices and
because these groups of workers may differ in their valuation of plan perform-
ance measures. Workers choosing family coverage are older (41 years vs. 38),
are more likely to be male (67 percent vs. 44 percent), and are more likely to be
married and have dependents (2.95 covered dependents, on average, exclud-
ing themselves). Thus, employees choosing family coverage may be more
interested in some of the underlying HEDIS measures used to determine plan
ratings, such as childhood immunization rates or cesarean section rates. We
estimate models for both the single and family samples; however, the
reported results focus only on the sample of workers choosing family cover-
age because of sample-size issues and because the results do not differ signifi-
cantly by sample.2
The restriction to active, nonunion employees that chose coverage for the
1996 calendar year yields a sample of 46,486 employees, of which 26,720 chose
managed care plans.
HEALTH PLAN RATINGS
The firm that provided the data for this study required the plans with
which it contracted to report HEDIS 2.0 or 2.5 data. In some cases, plans were
unable to report all of the requested HEDIS measures. Since we use the under-
lying HEDIS data in our analysis, we imputed values for missing HEDIS
measures using the EM algorithm if the health plan reported at least 50 per-
cent of the requested HEDIS data. Plans that reported less than 50 percent of
the HEDIS data were dropped from our analysis (nine plans). The firm used
the data to rate plans on the same five domains as 1995 enrollment: physician
quality, surgical care, medical treatment, participant satisfaction, and preven-
tive care. Each domain was composed of several specific HEDIS measures;
however, the composition of measures within each domain varied somewhat
from the previous year (Table 1).3 Unlike the previous year, all plans were
assigned ratings for each domain.
The methodology used to determine the ratings for each plan for each
domain also differed from the previous year. Specifically, an index score was
assigned to each plan relative to the scores of other plans in the same geo-
graphic region. The index score for each domain was calculated by first
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computing a z-score for each measure in the domain based on the mean and
variance of reported values for a national sample of plans, including many not
offered by this firm. For example, the preventive care domain was made up of
the following HEDIS measures: childhood immunization rate, first trimester
prenatal care rate, cholesterol screening rate, mammography screening rate,
and cervical cancer screening rate.4 Within each domain, z-scores were averaged
to compute a domain score, and then, within each of 14 regions, plans with the
top-third scores were rated “superior quality,” the middle third were rated
“average quality,” and the bottom third were rated “needs improvement.”
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TABLE 1 Health Plan Quality Ratings and Their Measures
Rating Measures
Surgical care Cardiac catheterizations per 1,000 members (men 45-64)
Coronary artery bypass graft surgeries per 1,000
members (men 45-64)
Cholecystectomies per 1m000 members (women 30-64)
Hysterectomies per 1,000 members (women 45-64)
Laminectomies per 1,000 members (men 20-64)
PTCAs per 1,000 members (men 45-64)
Prostatectomies per 1,000 members (men 45-64)
Cesarean section rate per 100 live births
Preventive care Childhood immunization rate
Percentage of patients receiving prenatal care in first
trimester
Cholesterol screening rate (ages 40-64)
Mammography screening rate (women 52-64)
Cervical cancer screening rate (women 21-64)
Participant satisfaction Overall enrollee satisfaction
Percentage visited PCP in last 3 years (ages 40-64)
Telephone abandon rate
Waiting time in days for nonurgent appointment
Physician quality Percentage of PCPs that are board certified
Percentage of specialists that are board certified
Primary care turnover rate
Percentage of PCPs accepting new patients
Recredentialing score (verification of various aspects
of physician licensing, etc.)
Medical care Diabetic retinal exam rate
Medical and surgical days/1,000 (ages 45-64)
Mental health 90-day readmission rate
Follow-up rate following major mental health disorder
Note: PCP = primary care physician.
As part of their open enrollment materials, each employee was given an
information sheet for every plan in their choice set and a summary sheet com-
paring all plans in their choice set (Figures 1 and 2). These sheets conveyed the
information used in our analysis including the out of pocket price, the relative
size of the physician panel, the degree of integration (model type), and the
HEDIS-based ratings for each of the five domains.5 The plan sheets also con-
tained three additional ratings, two of which were developed by the firm
(“exceptional quality designation” and “benchmark HMO”), and a rating that
indicated whether the plan was accredited by the NCQA. None of these rat-
ings is included in our base analysis because they are not derived specifically
from the HEDIS data set and because of concern regarding the number of
explanatory variables relative to sample size and potential multicollinearity.
These three ratings are generally not related to plan choice, and the inclusion
of these ratings does not change the conclusions of our analysis.6fs20
As was the case with the ratings developed for 1995 enrollment, the ratings
constructed by the firm for 1996 enrollment are imperfect measures of plan
quality. For example, the scoring methodology and the process of aggregating
the measures to form domain ratings may do a poor job of valuing plan attrib-
utes from the perspective of enrollees (Scanlon et al. 1998). In addition, just as
for 1995 enrollment, the participant satisfaction rating for 1996 was based on
surveys developed independently by each plan, which was the HEDIS
requirement at the time. Because these surveys differed across plans, satisfac-
tion rates are not necessarily comparable, although comparability improved
between 1995 and 1996 because several plans adopted the standardized satis-
faction survey that eventually became a requirement in HEDIS 3.0.
Tables 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics for plans that were available to
active employees in our samples. Thirteen of the nonintegrated plans were
preferred provider organization (PPO) or point-of-service (POS) plans. The
unit of observation is the health plan. In the analysis, some plans are repre-
sented multiple times because they are offered in several markets. Note that
the mean price, $592, is very high. This reflects a generous benefits package
and a decision by the firm to charge high monthly prices and provide flex dol-
lars to compensate employees. The prices used in the analysis reflect the prices
charged to enrollees, and unspent flex dollars could be converted to pretax
income.
METHOD
The underlying econometric model is based on the assumption that
employees seek to maximize utility, and the utility derived by each individual
i from health plan j can be expressed as a function of health plan attributes. The
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FIGURE 1 Health Plan Fact Sheet
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FIGURE 2 Comparing Your Medical Options
methodology is outlined in detail elsewhere (Chernew and Scanlon 1998).
Utility of each plan is a function of plan attributes, a plan-specific error term,
and an error term that varies by chooser. This latter error is assumed to follow
a type I extreme value distribution.
Because it is likely in this study that unobserved plan attributes are impor-
tant and are systematically valued by potential enrollees, the plan-specific
error component is likely not equal to zero, and standard error estimates from
conditional logit models would be biased downward. A more appropriate
estimation technique approximates the conditional logit model by using
grouped data (Berry 1994; Chernew and Scanlon 1998). This approach models
the log difference in market share between a given plan (j) in a specific market
(m) and an arbitrarily chosen reference plan (j*) in the same market as a func-
tion of differences between the plans in the explanatory variables. This model
is outlined in Equation 1, in which υjm is a stochastic error and Pjm is the prob-
ability that plan j is chosen by each employee in market m.7 As the number of
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TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics for Plan Ratings (N = 96)
Domain Rating Mean




















Note: Plans reporting less than half of the measures comprising a specific rating were labeled
missing data for the respective rating.
employees approaches infinity in each market, the last two terms approach
zero, and the approximation becomes exact.
log(Sjm) – log(Sjm*) ≅ β′(Xj – Xj*) + (γj – γj*) + υjm/Pjm – υjm*/Pjm*. (1)
Each market contains (n – 1) observations (in which n is equal to the total
number of plans in a market), and the number of observations in the ordinary
least squares regression is equal to the sum of the observations for all markets.
The unit of analysis is the market, and we focus on workers in markets in
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics for Price and Nonprice Health Plan Attrib-
utes (N = 96)
Standard Percentage
Mean Deviation missinga
Price (dollars per month)b 592 32 0
Integration 0.260 0.441 0
Surgical care factora –0.250 0.855 0-5
Prevention factora 0.121 0.559 1-15
Physician board certification factora 0.086 0.542 7
CABG rate per 1,000 3.672 1.826 1
Cervical cancer screening rate (%) 0.746 0.071 1
Specialist certification rate (%) 0.836 0.074 7
Overall enrollee satisfaction 0.887 0.057 9
Percentage of physicians accepting
new patients 0.880 0.093 5
Prenatal care first trimester rate (%) 0.875 0.081 9
Cesarean-section rate (%) 0.206 0.038 7
Physician turnover rate (%) 0.082 0.345 10
Follow-up after mental health disorder (%) 0.749 0.136 22
Readmission for mental health disorder (%) 0.085 0.243 43
Medical/surgical days per 1,000 325.800 87.529 23
Recredentialing score (range 1-4)c 3.825 0.724 4
Percentage visiting PCP in last 3 years
(ages 40-64) 0.902 0.064 20
Diabetic retinal exam rate 0.398 0.134 9
Note: CABG = coronary artery bypass graft surgery; PCP = primary care physician.
a. Imputed data were used in computation of the factors. The range is the range of missing data for
variables comprising the factor.
b. Because plans can be offered at different prices in different markets, the unit of observation for
price is the (plan and market) combination.
c. Equals sum of four dummy variables indicating whether the plan checks specific physician cre-
dentials.
which at least 10 employees meet our sample criteria. The estimates are simi-
lar if we raise the threshold for inclusion to 20 employees.8 For the family-
coverage sample, there is sufficient data for 96 plans offered in 68 markets of
adequate size. Because some plans are offered in multiple markets, there are a
total of 222 plan/market observations. Because a reference plan is used for
each market, the family-coverage sample has 154 observations (222 – 68), rep-
resenting the choices of 9,719 employees. Because of fewer markets of ade-
quate size, the analogous numbers for the single-coverage sample are 105
observations, representing 5,536 employees.
In all models, the Xj vector includes the employee’s monthly out-of-pocket
plan contribution and the extent of plan integration (model type). In the first
specification, the X vector also includes dummy variables indicating the
scores on each of the five HEDIS-based plan ratings (two diamonds, “average
quality,” being the omitted category).
Because our analysis is cross sectional, we cannot identify the impact the
release of plan ratings had on choice. A positive relationship between ratings
and plan choice could reflect a response to the information. It might also indi-
cate that the ratings simply confirmed attributes employees knew already.
Similarly, weak correlation between the ratings and enrollment is consistent
with the hypothesis that employees did not respond to the ratings or that the
ratings and informal information offset each other.
If the correlation between the ratings and enrollment is negative, we cannot
definitively say the information release had no effect. Maybe without the
release, the correlation between the ratings and enrollment would have been
more negative. However, an inverse correlation does reveal that there are
other attributes, not captured in the rating system, influencing choice. The
inverse correlation reveals that these other attributes are inversely related to
the values captured by the rating system.
In the second set of specifications, the plan ratings are omitted in favor of
the HEDIS measures comprising those ratings.9 Prior research revealed coun-
terintuitive findings from the ratings analysis. Separate examination of the
relationship between underlying HEDIS measures and plan choice can pro-
vide insight into which HEDIS measures accounted for the results from the
ratings specifications.
Because the HEDIS measures are highly correlated with each other, we con-
densed the set of HEDIS measures into factors based on confirmatory factor
analysis using principal axis factoring with varimax rotation, grouping vari-
ables that were conceptually related and empirically related in exploratory
factor analysis. The factors used in our analysis and their component variables
and Cronbach’s alphas are reported in Table 4. Several HEDIS measures that
did not load strongly on these factors are included individually in our share
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models. As a test of sensitivity, we also estimate models that include dummy
variables indicating whether the analysis contained imputed HEDIS data for
measures that were not reported by the health plan. Another model replaces
the factor scores with the specific HEDIS measures that had the highest factor
loading on each of the three latent variables included in our analysis.
Finally, the third specifications include both the ratings and underlying
HEDIS measures. There are not a sufficient number of observations to esti-
mate one model with all of the ratings variables and HEDIS measures. Hence,
five specifications corresponding to each domain of performance were esti-
mated. Each model included the ratings for the relevant domain and the rele-
vant HEDIS factor and measures that comprised the rating.
If the ratings were dominant, one would expect the underlying HEDIS
measures would not predict plan choice in these models. Such a test requires
the assumption that important informal information is correlated with the
HEDIS measures. If this assumption holds, the coefficients on the HEDIS
measures should capture some of the impact of informal information. By
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TABLE 4 HEDIS-Based Factors
Factor Measures
Surgical care
α = .71 Prostatectomies per 1,000 members (men 45-64)
PTCAs per 1,000 members (men 45-64)
Coronary artery bypass graft surgeries per 1,000
members (men 45-64)
Cardiac catheterizations per 1,000 members (men 45-64)
Laminectomies per 1,000 members (men 20-64)
Cholecystectomies per 1,000 members (women 30-64)
Hysterectomies per 1,000 members (women 45-64)
Prevention
α = .82 Percentage visited PCP in last 3 years (ages 40-64)
Diabetic retinal exam rate
Cholesterol screening rate (ages 40-64)
Childhood immunization rate
Cervical cancer screening rate (women 21-64)
Mammography screening rate (women 52-64)
Physician board
certification
α = .72 Percentage of PCPs that are board certified
Percentage of specialists that are board certified
Note: PTCA = percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty; PCP = primary care physician.
holding the underlying HEDIS measures constant, the coefficients on the
ratings may more closely capture the true effect of the rating information on
plan choice. For example, controlling for the value of the surgical factor score
and the cesarean section rate, the coefficients on the surgery ratings may
reflect the impact of the firm-provided ratings to a greater extent. Essen-
tially, the coefficients on the ratings test for the effect of plan performance




Parameter estimates for the model relating choice to the HEDIS-based per-
formance ratings for workers choosing family coverage are presented in Table
5. For the performance ratings, the relative probabilities represent the prob-
ability of choosing a plan with the indicated rating relative to a plan that is
identical except rated “average quality” on the dimension in question. If
employees were responding strongly to the ratings, the relative probability
for “superior quality” would be greater than 1, and the relative probability for
“needs improvement” would be less than 1. The relative probability for price
reflects a difference of $10 per month (the mean price is $592/month).
The hypothesis that none of the report card ratings enters the model can be
rejected at the 0.05 level. Yet, the coefficients on the ratings are varied in their
impact (Table 5).10 For example, none of the “missing data” ratings is signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 0.10 level, suggesting that employees were
not systematically attracted or deterred from plans that did not report enough
data to be assigned one of the three rating categories. For only one of the
domains, satisfaction, do the estimates support the hypothesis that employees
responded to the reported ratings in the manner hypothesized (the “superior
quality” coefficient is positive, and the “needs improvement” coefficient is
negative). Only the “needs improvement” result is statistically significant,
however.
This finding contrasts with our previous work in which the satisfaction rat-
ing was consistently inversely related to plan choice. Several differences in the
construction of the ratings may explain the difference in findings. For exam-
ple, the 1995 satisfaction index included a measure of the percentage of physi-
cians accepting new patients. This measure may be correlated inversely with
enrollee preferences if acceptance of new patients is inversely related to physi-
cian popularity.
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TABLE 5 Estimates of the Relationship between Plan Choice and Plan Ratings
Coefficient Relative Probability





Preventive carea Superior –0.029 0.97
(0.340) (0.93)
Needs improvement –0.079 0.92
(0.395) (0.84)
Missing data –0.147 0.86
(0.875) (0.87)
Participant satisfactiona Superior 0.158 1.17
(0.316) (0.62)
Needs improvement –0.844 0.43
(0.474) (0.07)
Missing data –0.660 0.52
(0.503) (0.19)
Medical treatmenta Superior 0.534 1.71
(0.297) (0.07)
Needs improvement 0.399 1.49
(0.312) (0.20)
Missing data –0.562 0.57
(0.740) (0.45)
Physician qualitya Superior –0.276 0.76
(0.291) (0.34)
Needs improvement –0.070 0.93
(0.274) (0.80)
Missing data 0.037 1.04
(0.390) (0.93)
Surgical carea Superior –1.254 0.29
(0.289) (<.001)
Needs improvement 0.088 1.09
(0.314) (0.78)
Missing data 0.031 1.03
(0.399) (0.94)
Note: N = 154; Adjusted R2 = 0.21. p values and standard errors are adjusted for possible hetero-
scedasticity.
a. “Average quality” was the omitted category.
For three of the remaining domains—prevention, medical treatment, and
physician quality—the “superior quality” and “needs improvement” coeffi-
cients have the same sign, suggesting a U or inverse-U shape between the rat-
ing and enrollment. For prevention, both coefficients are small and statisti-
cally insignificant, suggesting no relationship between the rating and
enrollment. If outliers are removed, the coefficients are consistent with our
earlier work and support the hypothesized relationship between ratings and
enrollment. The estimates are not statistically significant however.11
For the medical treatment domain, the coefficient on “superior quality” is
positive and statistically significant. The “needs improvement” coefficient is
not statistically different from zero.12 The point estimate suggests that enrol-
lees are 49 percent more likely to enroll in a plan rated “needs improvement”
than a plan rated “average performance” in this domain.
For the physician quality domain, the coefficients suggest that enrollees are
most likely to enroll in plans rated “average quality.” Although neither coeffi-
cient is statistically different from zero, the coefficient on “superior quality” is
larger in absolute value than that on “needs improvement,” which is close to
zero. If outliers are omitted, the “needs improvement” coefficient becomes
positive, although it remains small and statistically insignificant. This sug-
gests that employees may prefer plans not rated “superior quality” on this
dimension of plan performance. This may be due to the fact that for 1996
enrollment, the firm moved the “percentage of physicians accepting new
patients” measure into the physician quality domain from the satisfaction
domain.
The strongest result from the analysis is the inverse relationship between
probability of plan enrollment and a rating of “superior quality” on the surgi-
cal care domain. This domain captures use of surgical procedures, with more
use considered worse. Employees seem to prefer plans with higher rates of
use, which may reflect easier access to specialists.
Price is correlated inversely with enrollment, although it is not statistically
significant. The relative probability for the price coefficient indicates that
active nonunion employees choosing family coverage are approximately 6
percent less likely to choose a plan with an out-of-pocket price of $602/month
than an otherwise identical plan with a mean price of $592/month. The mag-
nitude of the price coefficient is smaller than those estimated in other studies
(Feldman et al. 1989). For any dollar change in price, we estimate a smaller
response. Yet, our base prices are much higher than those observed in other
studies. In Feldman et al. (1989), a $5 change in price approximated a doubling
of price, a much larger percentage change than in our study. Because elastici-
ties relate the percentage change in volume (enrollment) to a percentage
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change in price, the elasticities implied by our work would be different than
those implied by other studies.
The coefficient on integration is not statistically different from zero but sug-
gests that employees prefer more integrated plans, controlling for price and
the dimensions of performance captured by the ratings. The insignificance of
the coefficient may reflect measurement error associated with blurring dis-
tinctions between plan types and heterogeneity within plan types.
On balance, the results examining the relationship between plan choice and
the performance ratings support earlier conclusions that employees did not
respond strongly to the firm-developed HEDIS-based ratings.
UNDERLYING HEDIS MEASURES
The results from the regressions that include the underlying HEDIS meas-
ures are generally consistent across models (Table 6). However, correlation
among variables occasionally inflates or deflates the point estimates (and p
values), although the sign of the coefficients does not change across
specifications.
Consistent with the results from the surgical care ratings, employees prefer
plans that perform more surgeries. The correlation among surgery rates
makes it difficult to identify the impact of specific surgery measures. We could
not identify any specific surgical category that might explain the inverse cor-
relation between the surgery rating and enrollment. It appears as if there is a
common factor related to all surgeries, such as ease of referral, that accounts for
the finding. For example, the surgical care factor score, coronary artery bypass
graft (CABG) surgery rate, and cesarean section rate are all positively related to
the probability of plan enrollment. The findings do not necessarily suggest
that employees prefer cesarean sections, for example, but they may prefer
plans with management systems that do not discourage use of cesarean sec-
tions or other surgeries. Because the rating system would have encouraged
employees into plans with fewer surgeries, we take this as evidence that
employees were aware of differences in access to surgical treatment (or corre-
lates of access, such as ease of specialist referrals) and chose plans with easy
access. Because our analysis is cross sectional, we cannot determine if the rat-
ings dampened this relationship, but they certainly did not overwhelm it.
The results regarding the prevention factor score and the cervical cancer-
screening rate reveal a negative but statistically insignificant relationship
between enrollment and use of these procedures. It may be that employees
understand that these services will be available in each of the plans if
desired.13 However, the prenatal care rate is positively and significantly
related to plan enrollment in all four models in Table 6, suggesting that
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TABLE 6 Estimates of the Relationship between Plan Choice and HEDIS
Measures
Relative Relative Relative Relative
Probability Probability Probability Probability
(p Value) (p Value) (p Value) (p Value)
Price 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.93
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16)
Integration 1.07 1.06 1.61 1.03
(0.83) (0.85) (0.08) (0.94)
Surgical care factor 1.54 1.51 1.50
(0.01) (0.01) (< .005)
Prevention factor 0.84 0.84 0.83
(0.46) (0.46) (0.35)




Cervical cancer screening rate 0.84
(0.40)
Specialist certification rate 0.64
(< .003)
Overall enrollee satisfaction 1.18 1.18 1.06 1.24
(0.14) (0.14) (0.57) (0.06)
Percentage of physicians accepting 0.86 0.86 0.77 0.82
new patients (0.27) (0.23) (0.04) (0.13)
Prenatal care first trimester rate 1.43 1.46 1.45 1.59
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01)
Cesarean section rate 1.33 1.31 1.48 1.31
(0.12) (0.13) (0.01) (0.11)
Physician turnover rate 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.88
(0.78) (0.03) (0.01) (0.07)
Follow-up after mental 1.29 1.27 1.59 1.01
health disorder (0.02) (0.02) (< .002) (0.94)






Dummies for imputed values No No Yes No
N 154 154 154 154
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.12
Note: CABG = coronary artery bypass graft surgery.
employees are between 43 and 59 percent more likely to enroll in plans that
provide more prenatal care.
The certification factor is consistently related inversely to plan enrollment
and statistically different from zero. We do not believe this reflects a prefer-
ence of employees for non-board-certified physicians. Instead, this result
could reflect a correlation between other plan attributes and certification.
Although we cannot identify which type of informal information is generat-
ing this result, we take this finding as evidence that plan traits not observed by
the researcher or contained in HEDIS are important.
The results regarding the percentage of physicians accepting new patients
also support our earlier hypotheses (although they are statistically significant
only when the imputation dummies are included). Specifically, employees are
less likely to enroll in plans with many physicians accepting new patients.
This may reflect a correlation between acceptance of new patients and physi-
cian popularity. We were unable to explore similar hypotheses with data on
waiting times because these measures were dropped from the analysis
because of too much missing data.
Survey-based measures of employee satisfaction (overall enrollee satisfac-
tion) are positively related to enrollment, although the results are generally
not statistically significant. This is consistent with the findings from the analy-
sis of firm-reported ratings and confirms our hypothesis from previous work
that could not be addressed with the earlier data. Specifically, the significant
inverse relationship between the satisfaction rating and enrollment observed
in prior work was not due to preferences for plans with low satisfaction scores
but instead reflected other measures included in the index that were inversely
related to enrollment (e.g., percentage of primary care physicians accepting
new patients).
Finally, the coefficient on price reflects an inverse relationship between
price and enrollment. The results from these models are typically stronger
than the specification that included the performance ratings and are signifi-
cantly different from zero in three of the four models. The coefficient on inte-
gration remains positive although generally not statistically significant.
RATINGS AND HEDIS MEASURES
These results also suggest that employees did not respond strongly to the
plan ratings (Table 7). In a few cases, the coefficients on ratings move in the
hypothesized direction (in the positive direction for the coefficient on “supe-
rior quality” and in the negative direction for the coefficient on “needs
improvement”). Yet in other cases, the coefficients move in the opposite direc-
tion. In no case do the fundamentally counterintuitive signs on the ratings
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variables reverse sign when the underlying HEDIS measures are controlled
for in a linear fashion.
DISCUSSION
Considerable efforts are under way to convey plan performance informa-
tion to consumers. These efforts are typically based on the notion that consum-
ers are uninformed and will use plan performance ratings to aid in their
enrollment decisions. Although longitudinal data would be necessary to
assess the true impact of the release of plan performance ratings, this work
suggests that the ratings did not have a major influence on plan enrollment at
a large firm in 1996. However, because the analysis is cross sectional, the
effects of information cannot be disentangled from the effects of plan attrib-
utes valued by the employees that would have been observed even without
the release of formal ratings.
There are several potential explanations for why enrollment was not
strongly related to the plan ratings. These explanations are not mutually
exclusive. First, many employees may never have seen the ratings even
though they were included as part of the open enrollment materials. It is possi-
ble that employees who were satisfied with their existing plan and had no
intention of switching may have ignored the ratings. Prior work found no dif-
ference in the results for a sample of switchers.
Second, employees may have distrusted the source of the ratings—the
employer. Third, employees may have found the ratings confusing or difficult
to understand. Fourth, information obtained from informal channels may off-
set the impact of the ratings.
The counterintuitive signs indicate that the latter explanation may be
important. The first three explanations would suggest no significant relation-
ship between plan performance ratings (or measures) and enrollment. Yet, the
finding of several statistically significant counterintuitive signs suggests that
unobserved factors are important. Moreover, the general pattern of results is
consistent with the hypothesis that informal information matters.
Substantial research indicates that consumers are interested in such meas-
ures (U.S. General Accounting Office 1995; Tumlinson et al. 1997; Robinson
and Brodie 1997; Hibbard and Jewett 1996). The findings from this study sug-
gest that additional research is needed to identify how (or if) consumers use
plan performance ratings in an environment when other sources of informa-
tion are available.
Finally, the results from this study should not be interpreted as evidence for
abandoning health plan performance measurement or reporting. Instead,
measurement and reporting efforts might be refined and directed toward the
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TABLE 7 Estimates of the Relationship between Plan Choice, Plan Ratings, and HEDIS Measures
Surgical Care Preventive Care Participant Satisfaction Physician Quality Medical Care
Relative Probability Relative Probability Relative Probability Relative Probability Relative Probability
(p Value) (p Value) (p Value) (p Value) (p Value)
Price 0.909 0.976 0.968 0.913 0.985
(0.05) (0.62) (0.47) (0.06) (0.73)
Integration 1.225 1.013 1.095 0.960 0.928
(0.59) (0.97) (0.77) (0.91) (0.85)
Superior 0.470 0.912 1.261 0.760 1.694
(< 0.01) (0.77) (0.31) (0.27) (0.16)
Needs improvement 0.881 1.266 0.384 1.247 1.149
(0.69) (0.50) (0.03) (0.43) (0.63)
Missing data 0.824 0.422 0.555 0.302 0.538
(0.62) (0.18) (0.14) (0.03) (0.28)







Cesarean section rate 1.541
(0.21)









Physician turnover rate 0.820
(0.02)
Percentage of physicians















N 154 154 154 154 154
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.01
7
7
most appropriate audience.14 For example, plan performance information
may be most valuable to employers when selecting the set of plans to offer.
Moreover, the possibility that the collection and reporting of performance
measures may encourage health plans to improve the quality of care provided
should not be forgotten.
NOTES
1. HEDIS is the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (National Committee
for Quality Assurance 1995).
2. The results regarding performance measures (ratings and HEDIS variables) are
similar for both the single-coverage and family-coverage samples. In the single
sample, the price coefficient varies widely across specifications and is positive in
specifications with the ratings, which we believe reflects overfitting of the model
and correlation with other variables (notably integration).
3. For example, the percentage of physicians accepting new patients, a HEDIS meas-
ure, was included in the employee satisfaction domain in 1995 and the physician
quality domain in 1996.
4. The measures of use are typically computed using an appropriate denominator (for
example, cesarean section rates are computed as a percentage of live births). How-
ever, other than these adjustments, case-mix severity is not controlled for.
5. Information on physician panel size and model type (integration) was included on
the back of the health plan summary sheet (Figure 1).
6. Only the “exceptional quality designation” rating is significantly related to plan en-
rollment (in the positive direction) when these three ratings are included in the base
analysis.
7. The probability of choosing plan j is identical for all employees in a market since this
probability is modeled only as a function of plan characteristics (which do not vary
by employee). In our analysis, the probability differs for family- and single-
coverage choosers by virtue of estimating separate regressions for each sample.
8. The model in Equation 1 is heteroscedastic because markets differ in size and plans
differ in the probability they will be chosen. The base model, which included the
HEDIS-based ratings, revealed heteroscedasticity. However, tests for heterosce-
dasticity could not reject the hypothesis that the errors were homoscedastic in the
models that included the underlying HEDIS measures. This may indicate that the
variance in the unobserved plan traits, the gs, dominates the variance in the aggre-
gated individual-specific stochastic terms. An unweighted version of Equation 1 is
reported using standard errors and p values robust to heteroscedasticity. Unad-
justed standard errors and models weighted by market size yield much the same
results.
9. Not all plans reported each HEDIS measure. We dropped nine plans reporting
fewer than 50 percent of all measures. Similarly, we dropped HEDIS measures that
were commonly not reported. The remaining missing data were imputed using the
EM algorithm. Given the number of plans missing some data, this approach is pref-
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erable to analysis of only complete cases (Little 1992). However, the imputation will
affect our standard errors.
10. We can reject the hypothesis that the performance measures can be aggregated into
one index representing the sum of superior ratings or that the four nonsatisfaction
scores can be aggregated into a single index. Such aggregate indices would mask
the heterogeneity of the estimated coefficients.
11. Outliers are defined as observations with a studentized residual greater than 2 (in
absolute value) (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch 1980).
12. In the weighted version of the model, the coefficient on “needs improvement” in
the medical treatment domain is much larger and statistically significant and the
coefficient on “superior quality” is about half as large as that reported (still posi-
tive) and not statistically significant.
13. This relationship becomes statistically significant in the weighted regression
models.
14. Updated versions of HEDIS already exist that include expanded measures of out-
comes and standardized measures of satisfaction. Other plan performance meas-
urement systems, such as the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey
(CAHPS), have also been developed. These revised systems may provide more
useful data. Virtually all of the measures in this analysis are included in the most re-
cent version of HEDIS (HEDIS 3.0), although some of the detail surrounding con-
struction of the measures has been refined. HEDIS 3.0 also contains additional
measures of plan performance, generally related to the quality of care. For example,
HEDIS 3.0 includes measures of the use of beta blocker treatment following heart
attack, appropriate use of antibiotics for children’s ear infections (otitis media), and
the percentage of low-birth-weight babies delivered at facilities designed to handle
them. HEDIS 3.0 also uses a standardized satisfaction survey. The refinement and
expansion of HEDIS may strengthen the relationship between report card meas-
ures and plan choice.
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